This paper asks whether new technological capacity for producing and exporting additional products provides incentives for greater capital accumulation, without being fully reflected in a higher rate of total factor productivity (TFP) growth. Using a highly disaggregated data set of each country's trade flows into the United States (from 1972-94, disaggregated into over 1000 rather than 10s of product categories, and containing over 1 million data points), we construct a direct and independent measure of technological improvements for each country over time based on the number of new product varieties exported to the United States. We show, in a panel data setting, that acquiring the technological capacity for producing new products stimulates more rapid capital accumulation in developing countries, even after holding fixed the rate of TFP growth. Our findings provide evidence against the alternative view that technological improvements are essentially unimportant: a view based on the findings of Young (1995) and others that instances of spectacular economic growth have been associated with unspectacular rates of TFP growth. We provide a model to demonstrate how an expansion in the technological capacity for producing additional products can lead to more rapid factor accumulation, without necessarily improving measured TFP. The findings of this paper suggest that while rapid accumulation of physical and human capital may have characterized the East Asian growth experience, these gains were stimulated by stellar improvements in technological capacity.
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Introduction
Since the late 1990s, India has been in the midst of a rapid accumulation of human capital and skill. In Bangalore, Hyderabad, and elsewhere, large numbers of Aptech and other training centers have been churning out skilled programmers for the country's export-oriented software industry. Often, these individuals are paying many times more for a three month course in programming than they would be paying for a full year in a college degree program. Where did this all start? People close to the software industry will tell you that the arrival of the internet, coupled with the flurry of Y2K projects, created an enormous demand for programmers in India. 1 This has provided a great incentive for individuals to educate themselves in the skills required in the industry.
The point is that human and physical capital are not accumulated in a vacuum.
In this paper, we present a novel approach to examine the effect of technological improvements on capital accumulation. In particular, we ask whether new technological capacity for producing and exporting additional products provides incentives for greater capital accumulation, without being fully reflected in a higher rate of total factor productivity (TFP) growth. Using a highly disaggregated data set of trade flows to the United States (by country of origin, from 1972-94, disaggregated into over 1000 rather than 10s of product categories, and containing over 1 million data points), we construct a direct and independent measure of technological improvements for each country over time, based on the number of new product varieties exported to the United States. We show, in a panel data setting, that acquiring the technological capacity for producing new products leads to more rapid accumulation of capital in developing countries, even after holding fixed the rate of TFP growth.
2 1 These two exogenous events likely had a more pronounced effect in delivering projects to India than to other countries because of a large Indian expatriate presence in the US software industry. 2 We focus on the accumulation of physical capital. However, preliminary tests indicate that technological improvements also have a positive impact on the incentives to accumulate human capital. An increase in the range of products over which a country has expertise initially raises T F P and stimulates greater accumulation. However, greater accumulation in turn induces a decline in T F P back to its initial level as the country experiences a deterioration in its terms of trade. 5 Thus, our model clarifies how acquiring the technological capacity for producing and exporting additional products can lead to a higher rate of capital accumulation, but not be reflected in a higher measured rate of T F P growth in the long run.
Conceptually, if output and inputs are measured perfectly in constant prices, we will not necessarily want our measures of T F P growth to be affected by changes in terms of trade. However, in practice, there are a number of reasons why terms of trade changes can affect measured T F P growth rates. In very simple terms, whenever the constant price base year is updated in national accounts, the relative weights placed on different products change. If a country experiences a terms of trade deterioration in products experiencing rapid productivity growth, measured T F P growth rates will be biased downward. 6 Given the myriad of problems associated with measured rates of T F P growth, it becomes necessary to have an independent measure of technological improvements, to assess its effect on capital accumulation and to determine whether it is fully reflected in measured T F P growth rates. One of the innovations of this paper is that we construct a direct and independent measure of technological improvements. Using a rich data set of trade flows into the United States, we directly measure the evolution of each country's capacity to produce additional products for the world market over time. This measure of new product technology has the added advantage of being independent of national income accounts data, and thus does not suffer from the problems which plague T F P measurements.
Empirically, the main difficulty in testing for the effect of new product technology on capital accumulation is the problem of reverse causality: a higher growth rate of capital can itself allow countries to produce and export a greater range of products over time. We adopt a number of empirical strategies for dealing with this problem.
Most importantly, we exploit the panel structure of our data set to show that a larger increment of new product technology in period t − 1 leads to a higher rate of capital accumulation in period t, even after we hold fixed the rate of accumulation in period t − 1. This provides compelling evidence of an effect of new product technology on the rate of capital accumulation because we are able to hold fixed exogenous factors responsible for different rates of capital accumulation. We also show empirically that there exists a positive effect of new product technology on capital accumulation even after we hold fixed the rate of T F P growth. Thus, the contribution of technological improvements in the form of new product technology is not fully reflected in the measured rate of T F P growth. This suggests that using the T F P growth rate to assess the contribution of technological improvements-as is done in certain interpretations of the growth accounting exercise of Young (1995) and others-is likely to lead to an underestimation of the importance of technological improvements.
The primary policy implication arising from this paper is that developing countries attempting to raise their investment (and enrollment) rates must pay close attention to building their technological capacity: in particular, to expanding the range of products they are able to competitively export to the world market. We do not deny that fiscal measures, financial deepening, tax incentives, and other policy measures can mobilize greater resources and raise rates of capital accumulation. However, focusing on such measures alone amounts to focusing on only one side of the equation:
unless developing countries acquire the capacity to productively utilize the greater resources, these resources may not materialize in the first place. On the other hand, acquiring the expertise to competitively produce and export a wider range of products is likely to provide powerful incentives to accumulate greater resources.
A detailed look at which policy measures are most effective in enabling countries to acquire the technological capacity for producing additional products is an interesting area for further work. In this paper, we focus on marshalling evidence to demonstrate the effects of such technological improvements on capital accumulation. However, our measure of technological improvements based on new product varieties opens up a potentially lucrative research agenda which would seek to explain why certain countries have been more successful in expanding the range of products over which they have expertise.
There exists a previous literature on the determinants of savings which addresses the question of why rates of capital accumulation differ across countries and over time. While this literature does not focus explicitly on the role of technological improvements, one of the salient findings is that high savings rates are associated with high growth rates. 7 Indeed, Carroll and Weil (1994) find that growth causes savings, but that savings does not cause growth. This is a strong suggestion that technological improvements provide incentives for higher rates of savings and capital accumulation.
Along a somewhat different line, Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) show that exogenous technological improvements in the form of high yielding seed varieties during the Green Revolution in India led to higher rates of human capital accumulation in areas where adoption was the greatest.
In order to satisfactorily answer the question posed in this paper, we need to address three fundamental issues. First, we need to make the case that our constructed measure of new product technology is a reasonable measure of technological improvements. Second, we need to provide a theoretical model to understand why such technological improvements should lead to a higher rate of capital accumulation without 7 See Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven (1996) and Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Serven (2000).
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being fully reflected in a higher measured rate of T F P growth. And third, we need to empirically demonstrate that our measure of new product technology does indeed lead to a higher rate of capital accumulation without being fully reflected in a higher measured rate of T F P growth. The following three sections address each of these issues in turn.
Measure of Technological Improvements
The concept of technological improvements we use throughout this paper is the capacity to competitively produce additional products for the world market. Thus, technology is specific to product lines and essentially reflects knowledge and expertise to competitively organize production of a particular product and deliver it to buyers on the world market. This is similar to the concept of technology in the technology, trade, and new growth literature, pioneered by Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Romer (1990) . The one distinction is that in this paper, technology is explicitly the variety of products a country is able to produce, rather than the variety of intermediate inputs the country is able to utilize in production or the variety of products the country is able to consume, both of which are affected by the total variety of products available in the world to freely trading nations. The model presented in our paper makes clear why the number of products a country is able to produce is the appropriate measure of technology for our purposes.
We measure expansion in the number of products each country is able to produce using data on trade flows into the United States by country of origin. This data, compiled by Feenstra (1996) , is disaggregated into over 1000 product categories (at the 5-digit SITC level) and covers 160 countries or territories of origin, from 1972-94. 8 We focus on the 87 countries for which we have capital stock data. For each countryyear combination, we count the number of first-time zero to positive conversions within product lines. We require each within-category export initiation to be above $10,000 and we require the initiation to be followed up with one immediate subsequent year of exports: these requirements are intended to rule out erratic exports and to ensure that the export initiations are substantial enough to signal that the country has acquired technological expertise in the product concerned. Then, the number of such export initiations for each country-year reflects the number of new products the country has learned to produce competitively for the world market during that year.
Thus, our NewP roducts variable is defined as follows:
where I ijt = 1 if year t is the first year in which country i exports product j, and
Table A1 provides a snapshot of the raw data. It lists 3 products exported by Thailand, starting from the first year of exports. This snapshot provides a sense of the high level of disaggregation in the data. In addition, it is interesting to note that the product export initiations occur post-1972, and in these three cases, long after 1972.
This feature of the data-the fact that there are many product export initiations by countries all along the time period-is a result of the high level of disaggregation. If we were instead using data at the 2-digit level, most "products" would be exported by all countries in all years, and tracking products over time would not be a meaningful exercise.
There are a number of additional issues in measuring new product technology using data on export initiations to the United States. First, we are measuring the number of 9 To be more accurate, I ijt = 1 if year t is the first year in which country i exports more than $10,000 worth of product j AND country i also exports more than $10,000 worth of product j in year t + 1.
10 It is interesting to note that Feenstra and Rose (2000) use disaggregated data on imports into the United States to rank products by level of technological sophistication: a more sophisticated product is one which is, on average, imported into the United States in a later year. In our analysis, we treat all products identically: first time exports of any product by a country amounts to an identical increment of technological capacity. 8 new products in exports rather than in domestic output. This is appropriate because the concept of technology we are interested in is the capacity to become a competitive producer of the product for the world market. If a product in domestic output is produced under trade protection and is of shoddy quality, it does not signal that the country has acquired expertise in that product. For many developing countries with limited domestic market size, it is important to be able to produce the product competitively for the world market, and non-zero exports of the product to the United States serves as a better signal, albeit a noisy signal, that they have acquired the capacity to do so.
Second, we are using data on exports to the United States, rather than to all destinations. While this choice is dictated by the much higher level of disaggregation of the data on trade flows into the United States, there are good reasons why this may not be a serious limitation. First, the United States is the single largest market and expertise to competitively export a new product is likely to show up in exports to the United States. In fact, the ability to export to the US market provides us with a uniform standard against which we assess product expertise. Second, since we are not measuring the quantity of exports, but rather the 0/1 signal of export initiations within product categories, our consideration of only the US market is less likely to be problem.
Of course, distance from the United States is likely to affect the incremental number of products a country exports to the US over time. In addition, larger countries are likely to have a more diversified production base, and this can show up in a larger incremental number of products exported to the US as transport costs fall over time.
We thus construct an alternative measure of technological improvements, NewT ech, by filtering out the effect of country size and distance as follows:
Distance and country size explain about 15% of the variation in NewP roducts in the pure cross-section and about 10% in the panel. We utilize both measures, NewP roducts and NewT ech, in our empirical work. Of course, as pointed out earlier, it is natural to suspect that our NewP roducts and NewT ech measures not only provide a signal of new technological capacity, but are also influenced by exogenous capital accumulation and by omitted third variables that are correlated with exogenous capital accumulation. We would like to call attention to two points in this regard. First, since we count the 0/1 signal of whether or not a product is exported, our measure of expansion in technological capacity is likely to be more exogenous than if we had measured the quantity of exports. Second, when we test for the effect of NewP roducts and NewT ech on capital accumulation, we will exploit the panel structure of our data to hold fixed exogenous factors responsible for different rates of capital accumulation.
In order to throw further light on whether it is new technological capacity or merely capital deepening that is picked up by our measure of NewP roducts, it is interesting to consider some recent informal evidence presented by Hausmann and Rodrik (2002) .
The authors take pairs of countries with similar factor endowments-Bangladesh and Pakistan, Honduras and the Dominican Republic, and Taiwan and South Korea-and investigate whether the countries within each pair have similar patterns of specialization, as one would expect. For this purpose, they look at each country's disaggregated exports to the United States.
The authors find that while similar factor endowments might lead to a similar pattern of specialization at a fairly aggregate 2-digit level, it does very little to explain which products countries export at a more disaggregated 6-digit level. For example, out of the top 25 6-digit products in Pakistan's export basket to the United States, there are many products for which Bangladesh's exports are very small or zero. A similar pattern appears when one looks at Pakistan's exports of the top 25 products in Bangladesh's export basket to the United States.
11 Thus, as Hausmann and
Rodrik point out, while factor endowments might help us determine that Pakistan or Bangladesh will export labor-intensive manufactures, that still leaves hundreds of products up for grabs. It seems reasonable to think, therefore, that acquired technological capacity must have something to do determining with which of these disaggregated products and how many of these products each country will produce over time.
to its initial level as the country experiences a deterioration in its terms of trade.
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In order to understand why more rapid accumulation induces a decline in T F Pthrough terms of trade-in the long run, notice that specialization is a fundamental element of our model. The domestic economy specializes in a certain subset of products, although this pattern of specialization is endogenously determined in equilibrium. Then, as a country accumulates capital more rapidly, it increases production of the commodities in which it specializes, and thereby experiences a decline in its terms of trade. While it also expands the range of products it produces and exports, this is not sufficient to prevent a terms of trade deterioration.
Our model shares some common features with another model developed separately
by Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) . Both models combine international trade and specialization with AK production and accumulation within countries. In both models, although production is AK, the market in effect imposes diminishing returns. If a country accumulates capital faster than the rest of the world, it experiences a terms of trade decline, which reduces the returns to capital and discourages further accumulation. However, there are some crucial differences between the models. Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) adopt a fixed pattern of specialization using the Armington assumption that products are differentiated by country of origin. In our model, the pattern of specialization is determined endogenously in equilibrium from differences in relative productivities. Acemoglu and Ventura also assume that the cross country distribution of technology is time-invariant and their focus is on explaining how a stable world income distribution is achieved. On the other hand, our focus is on examining how technological improvements in within a country affects capital accumulation and measured T F P growth in that country over time.
A Simple Model
The product space takes the form of a continuum of products spread over the unit
There is no innovation: just a fixed product space. There is only one factor of production, K-construed as a broad measure of capital or of the resources of production. For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to the two-country setting, with a domestic economy and the rest of the world. While the product space is fixed, technological improvements in the domestic economy can allow it to produce and export a wider range of products. There is no capital mobility across countries.
Consumption. The K stock is owned by consumers in each country and K can be accumulated through savings. A representative consumer optimizes intertemporally in each country to decide how much to consume and how much to save:
where C τ is a consumption index which depends on the consumption of every product variety z ∈ [0, 1] in the unit interval through the following instantaneous utility function:
Note that this instantaneous utility function is of the Cobb-Douglas form, and implies that each atomistic product z will receive an equal weight in expenditure. Let p (z)
denote the price of each product. Then, the consumer's expenditure minimization problem can be solved to show that the price of the consumption index is given by the following:
The homothetic structure of instantaneous preferences implies that expenditure will be spread evenly over the unit interval, so that spending on any interval (z 1 , z 2 ) is given by
Production. Both countries are physically able to produce the entire range of products over the unit interval. However, they are able to do so with different technology parameters. In particular, the unit capital requirement for producing product z is a (z) in the domestic country and a * (z) in the foreign country. Products are ordered over the [0, 1] interval such that relative productivity of the domestic country is falling with z, as follows:
Capital resources earn a return of w K in the domestic economy and w * K in the foreign economy. The size of capital resources in the domestic and foreign economy are given by K and K * respectively. We normalize the price of the z = 1 product to unity:
Equilibrium without accumulation. Let us first ignore the issue of accumulation and solve for the simple Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson equilibrium with exogenously given factors of production in the two countries. Note that all products for which a(z)w K < a * (z)w * K will be produced exclusively in the domestic country, whereas the rest will be produced exclusively in the foreign country. The equilibrium relative returns will be given by the following:
where e z is the cutoff product, so that all products in the range (0, e z) are produced in the domestic country and the rest are produced abroad. Given this specialization pattern, our specification of preferences yielding a uniform distribution of expenditure over the unit interval, implies that a share e z of world expenditure will be spent on domestic products. If so, we have that e z (w *
This gives us the following:
Equations (4) and (5) together determine the pattern of specialization and the relative returns of the domestic economy, (e z, ω K ), as a function of the technology parameters and factor endowments. Note that because of our particular normalization of prices, p (1) = 1, we have that 13 : 13 The purpose of this model is to explain domestic variables relative to those of a rest of the Accumulation. Now, we introduce accumulation and intertemporal optimization by households. Households in the domestic economy hold capital resources K. They rent out their capital to firms and obtain a return w K K. They consume part of this income and save the rest to add to their resource holdings. So, we have the following relation for use of final output:
and similarly for the use of final output in the foreign country:
Note that we ignore depreciation for simplicity.
Next, intertemporal optimization by households implies that consumption must evolve according to the following in the foreign and domestic economies respectively:
where
ndicates that the relative return to capital is a function of the technology parameters (at the cutoff product) and the relative size of capital resources.
Steady-State Solution. We solve for a steady-state equilibrium with a constant share of products e z in the domestic economy. The intuition behind the steady-state solution is clear. Once we allow accumulation, the capital stocks in the two countries world benchmark: in particular, to explain the effect of a technological improvement in the domestic economy relative to the rest of the world. Thus, if we think of the a * (z) parameters as being fixedand instead focus on changes in the a (z) parameters-then our normalization of prices also fixes foreign wages as well as all prices for goods produced in the rest of the world.
respond to the different rates of return. In steady-state, with a constant specialization pattern (e z), the relative size of the capital stock in the two countries
14 Thus, we have that:K =K *
Furthermore, in each of the two countries in steady-state, the rate of growth of the capital stock must equal the growth rate of consumption:
So, from equations (11) and (12) , we see that consumption must grow at the same rate in the two countries. If so, since the two countries have the same subjective discount rate, equations (9) and (10) tell us that the rates of return must be equalized in the two countries, so that we have:
Thus, the endogenous accumulation of capital equalizes the returns to capital in the two countries in steady-state. Furthermore, (13) immediately implies that
In other words, in steady-state, each country produces only those goods in which it has an absolute advantage. 16 Figure 1 depicts the basic steady-state solution in product space. The exogenously given technology parameters a (z) and a * (z) pin 14 Note that if e z is constant, then (4) tells us that ω K will also be constant in steady-state. Then, from (5), we have that K * K will be fixed in steady-state. 15 We can show that if e z and ω K are constant, then P is also constant in steady-state. This requires us to assume that the technology parameters a(z) and a * (z) are either constant or falling uniformly over time at the same rate in both countries. If so, then
is constant provided thatz and ω K are constant. It follows that ω K P is constant. Then, equations (7) and (8) tell us that with a constant steady-state growth rate of capital in each country, we get equation (12) . 16 Note that the existence of such a steady-state equilibrium requires us to assume that each country has an absolute advantage in some range of goods. down the technology schedule A (z), and steady-state equilibrium is always reached at the point where this schedule evaluates to 1. The domestic economy produces and exports products in the range (0, e z)-i.e. those products in which its technological expertise is at least as good as the rest of the world: a (z) ≤ a * (z). Finally, (13) and (5) give us that:
We thus obtain the clear and simple result that the endogenously determined relative size of the capital stock in the domestic economy is exactly given by the share of products in which it has technological expertise.
The intuition for these results is clear. If the domestic economy produces the range of commodities for which a(z)w K < a * (z)w * K , and the rates of return to capital are equalized in steady state, then the domestic economy must produce the range of commodities for which a(z) < a * (z) in the steady state equilibrium. Second, since consumers spread their expenditure evenly over the unit interval, the share of commodities produced in the domestic economy (e z) must equal the domestic economy's share of world income. However, if returns to capital are equalized in the steady state, then the share of commodities produced in the domestic economy (e z) will equal the domestic economy's share of the world capital stock. At the root of both steady state results is the fact that returns to capital are equalized in steady state. And the intuition for that is clear: if the returns to capital in the domestic economy is higher, that induces faster capital accumulation, which in turn induces a terms of trade decline and therefore, also a decline in the returns to capital in the domestic economy.
Empirical Implications of a Technological Improvement.
Suppose that, starting from steady-state, the domestic economy experiences a technological improvement which allows it to produce an additional increment ∆z 1 of products. Specifically, this is represented by the domestic economy's a (z) parameter falling below a * (z) for some range of products. Figure 2 depicts such a technological improvement. Point A denotes the initial steady-state equilibrium. The technological improvement has the following effects:
• There is an immediate jump in the relative returns to capital in the domestic economy. The equilibrium moves immediately from point A to point B.
• Beginning immediately and over time, the higher relative returns to capital causes the rate of capital accumulation in the domestic economy to exceed that of the rest of the world. As a result of this higher rate of accumulation, the equilibrium moves over time from point B toward the new steady-state equilibrium at point C.
• We get an immediate expansion in the number of products the domestic country exports. Over time, we get a further expansion in the number of products exported by the domestic economy. What is happening here? While the country's a (z) parameter fell below a * (z) for the entire range (e z, e z 0 ), it does not export all these additional products immediately because the cost of capital in the domestic economy (w K ) rises above that of the rest of the world. As the relative returns (costs) revert to unity, the country eventually exports all the additional products in which it has acquired expertise.
One of the empirical implications arising from the model is that if a country has technological expertise in exporting a higher number of products, relative to its capital stock, then it should experience a larger growth rate of its capital stock. Recall that according to equation (15) , the relative size of the domestic economy's capital stock in steady-state is given by the range of products (z) that it is able to competitively export. This implies that, if the number of products a country is able to export, relative to its capital stock, ¡ z K ¢ , is higher than that of the rest of the world, then the country's capital stock should be growing faster than the rest of the world.
A second empirical implication clear from our discussion above is that, starting from steady-state or from any other equilibrium point, a technological improvement-in the form of an expansion in the number of products a country is able to export-raises the returns to capital and leads to a faster rate of growth of the capital stock. In fact, the greater is the increment in new products, the higher is the rate of capital stock growth.
Finally, measured aggregate productivity or T F P is given by
tivity growth is given byŶ −K =ŵ K . 17 So, while a technological improvement leads to an initial upward jump in the productivity level, over time, as the capital stock responds along the adjustment path, ω K reverts to unity. Indeed, in the new steadystate, the country has a higher relative K stock, but its T F P level is unchanged from before the technological improvement. In other words, if we compare a country which has experienced a technological improvement to one which has not, then the former will record a higher rate of capital accumulation, but no difference in its rate of T F P growth.
Empirical Strategy and Results
In line with the empirical implications emerging from our model, we would like to test for the effect of our measures of technological improvements (NewProducts & NewTech) on the rate of capital accumulation. Furthermore, we would like to test whether this effect of new product technology on capital accumulation remains even after we hold fixed the rate of T F P growth.
The Effect of NewP roducts
There are two significant difficulties in implementing the estimation. First, there is the reverse causality problem: namely, that the rate of capital accumulation itself can influence the number of new products a country exports over time. Thus, if there are reasons other than technological improvements why some countries accumulate more capital than others-and we agree that there are-then, countries with higher rates of capital growth will produce more new products simply because there are more resources available. Recall, however, that we count the 0/1 signal of whether or not a product is exported, rather than the size of exports itself. Thus, our measure of expansion in technological capacity is likely to be more exogenous than if we had measured the quantity of exports. Still, we acknowledge that there can be a reverse causality problem. Second, there is the problem of spurious correlation: omitted third variables, which generally increase the efficiency of production, can positively impact both the rate of capital accumulation as well as the number of new products a country exports.
We employ a number of complementary econometric specifications to deal with the problems of estimation. In our first specification, we control for a society's inherent tendency to accumulate capital using age dependency ratios (i.e. the percentages of the population over 65 years of age and under 15 years of age). 18 Furthermore, we control for omitted third variables that affect the efficiency of production using the initial level of TFP, as well as the TFP growth rate. We have previously made the argument that T F P measures are biased by terms of trade changes. In our model, it is terms of trade augmented T F P (
= w K in our model) that affects the rate of capital accumulation. Of course, our model does not allow us to think about third omitted variables that can independently affect both capital accumulation and NewP roducts. Ultimately, our purpose in controlling for T F P and T F P growth is to not only generally control for omitted third variables, but also to determine whether the effect of NewP roducts on capital accumulation holds even after we hold fixed the rate of T F P growth. 18 These demographic variables have been found to explain a significant part of the cross-country variation in savings and investment rates. See Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven (1996) and Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Serven (2000).
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The econometric specification takes the following form:
It is worthwhile to point out that the variable NewP roducts, rather than the growth rate of new products, is the appropriate measure of technological improvements here. This is because the product space is fixed in both the theory (by the unit interval) and in the data. As figure 2 shows, starting from steady-state, a greater increment in the share of the fixed product space that a country is able to produce (i.e. a greater ∆z or NewP roducts) will lead to a greater effect on the growth rate of capital along the adjustment path.
Our data on capital stock comes from Nehru and Dhareshwar (1994), as updated by Bosworth and Collins (1996) . The level and growth rate of T F P have been calculated using both physical and human capital and using a physical capital share of 0.4.
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The Old and Y oung age ratios are from the World Bank. We divide the 1972-94 period into four 5-year periods and one 3-year period (1972-75). 20 The estimation is carried out using time period fixed effects and using a heteroskedasticity-consistent estimation procedure. Table 2 presents the results of estimating a number of variants of (16). In the specification including all variables except for the T F P Gr rate (column 3), the estimated coefficient on ln (NewP roducts) is 0.0040 and is statistically significant at the 5% level. Thus, even after controlling for differences in a country's inherent tendency to save, as well as differences in the initial level of T F P , a greater expansion in the number of NewP roducts learned is associated with more rapid rates of capital accumulation. It is interesting to note that the magnitude of the effect is larger for the 19 Our measure of T F P is Y K α (HL) 1−α , α = 0.4. Human capital data is from Bosworth and Collins (1996) , which itself is based on Barro and Lee (1993) . 20 The results are essentially unchanged if we exclude the initial 3-year period. Of course, KGr it and NewP roducts it are each annual averages over the time period concerned.
subset of non-OECD developing countries (column 4).
21 This is not difficult to understand. In developing countries, technological improvements are more likely to take the form of acquiring the expertise to produce a greater share of the fixed product space. The OECD countries likely already possess the ability to produce products in most of the product categories in our data. In these countries, technological improvements are more likely to take the form of either increased product quality or greater variety within certain product categories.
Comparing columns 3 & 4 with columns 5 & 6, we see that including the T F P Gr rate in the specification reduces the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on ln (NewP roducts), although the coefficient remains statistically significant at the 5% level. The reduced magnitude can be due to a number of reasons. First, as is our intention, the T F P Gr rate may be controlling for improvements in omitted third variables (e.g. a reduction in political instability) which positively affect both NewP roducts and the growth rate of capital. This is akin to the reason why including the initial level of T F P reduces the magnitude of the coefficient on ln (NewP roducts). Second, there is the possibility that a technological improvement in the form of acquiring the capacity to produce new products can itself be reflected in a higher rate of T F P Gr during the 5-year period. This is not contrary to the predictions of the theory. Recall that according to the theory, T F P is unaffected by technological improvements only in the long run, once the capital stock has responded fully to the improvement. Along the adjustment path, NewP roducts can positively impact T F P (and hence the measured T F P Gr rate over the 5-year period). On the other hand, the empirical finding in columns 5 & 6 that the effect of NewP roducts on the growth rate of capital remains statistically significant even after holding fixed the T F P Gr rate, suggests that the measured T F P growth rates do not fully capture improvements in technological capacity. In other words, the results indicate that new product technology does lead to a higher rate of capital accumulation, without being fully reflected in a higher measured rate of T F P growth.
Finally, examining the effect of including the Old and Y oung age ratios in the estimation (compare columns 1 and 2) serves as an indirect test of reverse causality.
It is reasonable to expect that the age ratios have an effect on the growth rate of capital, but no independent effect on NewP roducts. Indeed, as we expected, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on ln (NewP roducts) declines from 0.0084 to 0.0057 (for the full sample of countries), suggesting that reverse causality is a problem. While the estimated coefficient remains statistically significant even after we use the Old and Y oung age ratios to control for exogenous reasons why savings rates differ across countries, there is still the nagging concern that we have not controlled for all exogenous reasons for why some countries save more than others. Thus, a plausible argument can be made that our results from the estimations in Table 2 do not conclusively demonstrate causality. We thus turn to our second set of specifications,
where we look at the effect of the initial number of P roducts on the growth rate of capital.
The Effect of the Initial Number of P roducts
According to the theory, a higher initial number of products, relative to the initial level of the capital stock, leads to a faster growth rate of capital. Since the relative size of an economy's K stock in steady state is fully determined by the number of P roducts (z) in which it has technological expertise (see equation 15), a lower level of the K stock relative to the number of P roducts implies that the country is farther behind its steady-state level of K, and hence that it must experience a higher rate of capital accumulation. In fact, the theory predicts that conditional on the initial level of capital, both P roducts 0,it as well as NewP roducts it should have an effect on the growth rate of capital: the former because it determines the current steady-state level of capital and the latter because it pushes the steady-state level of capital farther ahead of the current level of K.
Before we test for the effect of both variables jointly, we test separately for the effect of the initial number of products. The specification takes the following form:
Recall that P roducts 0,it here is the cumulative number of products that each country has ever exported up to the beginning of each 5-year period. We use the cumulative number of products, rather than the actual number of products exported in the particular year corresponding to the beginning of each 5-year period, because we seek to measure the range of products in which the country has knowledge or technological expertise. Thus, the underlying notion is that product-specific knowledge or expertise, once acquired, is not lost.
The results of the estimation are presented in table 3. The estimated coefficient on the initial number of P roducts is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in all variants of specification (17) , for the sample of non-OECD developing countries.
Since the initial number of products precedes the growth rate of capital over the 5-year period, there is a good case to be made for a causal interpretation of this finding.
Thus, developing countries starting out with expertise in producing a larger number of P roducts relative to their initial stock of capital will experience a faster rate of capital accumulation.
In the specification including the initial level of T F P (in addition to the initial number of P roducts), the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on P roducts 0,it is much reduced (columns 4 and 5). Indeed, for the full sample of countries, the estimated coefficient on P roducts 0,it is not significant at the 5% level (although it remains significant at the 5% level for the sample of developing countries). There is, however, a question about whether we want to include the initial level of T F P when testing for the effect of the initial number of P roducts. On the one hand, including the T F P level allows us to control for spurious correlation induced by omitted third variables that separately affect both P roducts 0,it and KGr it . On the other hand, the theory predicts that a higher initial number of P roducts, compared to the initial K stock, will imply that the country is farther behind its steady state, and this will be reflected in a higher T F P (ω K in the model). 22 Thus, we really have no compelling reason for believing that in specification (17) , the initial number of P roducts will have an effect on the growth rate of capital even after we hold fixed the initial level of T F P .
As discussed above, the theory predicts that both the initial number of P roducts as well as the NewP roducts increment over the 5-year period should have an effect on the growth rate of capital. The results in columns 8 and 9 (of table 3) show that when both variables are included in the specification, the estimated coefficient on NewP roducts is statistically significant, but that on the initial number of P roducts is not. In fact,
if, in addition to ln (NewP roducts) it and ln (P roducts) 0,it , we include the T F P Gr rate in the specification (not shown), the estimated coefficient on ln (NewP roducts) it is significant only at the 10% level. The problem here is that the two variables, P roducts 0,it and NewP roducts it are highly collinear-the simple bivariate correlation between the two variables is 0.77. It therefore becomes difficult to obtain precise estimates of the individual effects of these two variables within the same specification.
Still, in all such specifications, the coefficients on the two variables are jointly highly significant. 22 Note the distinction here from the issue discussed in the previous section about whether a larger NewP roducts is fully reflected in a higher T F P Gr rate over a 5-year period. Starting from steady-state, a larger NewP roducts over the 5-year period can stimulate a quick response from the capital stock, such that the level of T F P at the end of the period is unchanged from the beginning, and there is no effect on the measured T F P Gr rate over the 5-year period. Thus, including both NewP roducts and T F P Gr in specification (16) allowed us to legitimately test for the effect of NewP roducts on KGr while holding fixed the T F P Gr rate. In contrast, the theory predicts that in specification (17), a higher initial number of products, relative to the initial capital stock, must necessarily be reflected in a higher initial level of T F P . Thus, we have no legitimate reason to test for the effect of P roducts 0,it on KGr it , while holding fixed the initial level of T F P .
Causality Tests of Effect of NewP roducts on Capital Growth
A counter-argument to our causal interpretation of the estimated positive coefficient on ln (P roducts) 0,it can be made on the grounds that KGr it is correlated with KGr i,t−1 . Then, since KGr it−1 can lead to a higher NewP roducts i,t−1 (the reverse causality problem), and hence lead to a higher P roducts 0,it , our findings in section 4.2 may still not conclusively demonstrate causality. We thus turn next to looking at the effect of the lagged NewP roducts increment on the rate of capital growth. In doing so, we will also hold fixed the lagged growth rate of capital.
The theoretical justification for looking at the effect of NewP roducts i,t−1 on KGr it is clear: given a technological improvement in the form of NewP roducts i,t−1 , the K stock will likely not respond fully in period t − 1. Some of the adjustment to the new steady state will carry over into period t, so that KGr it will also be positively impacted. On the other hand, since NewP roducts i,t−1 precedes KGr it , the reverse causality argument is not immediately apparent. However, as explained above, KGr it could be correlated with KGr i,t−1 through unobserved third variables, and there exists the reverse causality concern that KGr i,t−1 can be responsible for some part of NewP roducts i,t−1 . Therefore, we also control for KGr i,t−1 . The specification takes the following form:
The results from estimating several variants of this specification are presented in Tables 4 and 5. The estimates in table 4 do not hold fixed the lagged growth rate of capital. The estimates in this table show that the lagged NewP roducts t−1 increment is associated with a higher growth rate of capital in period t. The more compelling findings are in table 5, where we hold fixed the growth rate of capital in period t − 1. This allows us to hold fixed unobserved factors responsible for differences in the lagged growth rate of capital, through which KGr i,t−1 affects NewP roducts i,t−1 .
Thus, we are able to take care of the reverse causality concern that NewP roducts i,t−1 could have resulted from KGr i,t−1 , which is correlated with KGr it . 23 The estimated coefficient on NewP roducts i,t−1 is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, thus providing compelling evidence that a technological improvement, in the form of acquiring the capacity to produce and export new products, leads to a higher rate of capital accumulation. Furthermore, the estimates in columns 3 and 4 show that even after we hold fixed the initial level of T F P and the T F P Gr rate in period t − 1, the effect of NewP roducts i,t−1 on the growth rate of capital is positive and statistically significant. This provides compelling evidence that the contribution of a technological improvement-in the form of new product technology-is not fully reflected in a higher rate of T F P growth.
It is worthwhile to point out that the estimated coefficient on ln (NewP roducts) i,t−1 in In light of this fact, the finding of a positive and significant effect is all the more compelling.
Finally, as a robustness check, the estimates in table 6 test for the effect of our
NewT ech variable on the rate of capital accumulation. Recall that this variable was constructed as an alternative measure of technological improvements by filtering out factors such as population and distance which may have led some countries to export a larger increment of products to the United States. The results show that NewT ech has a statistically significant positive effect on the rate of capital accumulation even after holding fixed the rate of T F P growth, both in the full sample of countries and in the sample of non-OECD developing countries.
Concluding Comments
We have used a range of specifications to control for problems of reverse causation and omitted third variable-induced spurious correlation in testing for the effect of our measure of technological improvements on the rate of capital accumulation. While the magnitude of the coefficient falls upon controlling for these problems, the effect remains positive and statistically significant. Furthermore, the effect of new product technology on capital accumulation remains significant even after holding fixed the rate of T F P growth. Thus, technological improvements in the form of acquiring the expertise to produce and export new products leads to a higher rate of capital accumulation, without being fully reflected in a higher measured rate of T F P growth.
Both international economists and macroeconomists have struggled to understand the relative contributions of available resources and technological capacity on the structure and size of production. On the one hand, the empirical Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek literature has used two pieces of information-available factors of production and assumptions about sectoral factor intensities across countries-to predict the structure of production. On the other hand, the growth accounting exercise implements a simple decomposition of economic growth into the contributions of capital accumulation and TFP growth. This paper shows that available resources can respond endogenously to an expansion in technological capacity. We make explicit the nature of such technological improvements-the acquired capacity to produce and export new products-and we also show that such improvements are not fully reflected in a higher growth rate of total factor productivity. True, high rates of economic growth are associated with high growth rates of capital and unspectacular rates of TFP growth.
However, these observations may be because stellar technological improvements stimulate high growth rates of capital and are not reflected in stellar measured rates of TFP growth. Thus, while we have no disagreements with the simple decomposition of the growth accounting exercise, our work shows that such simple decompositions 28 lack power to make causal interpretations. Equations estimated using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Controlling for KGr t-1 and ln(K/L) 0 .
